The Impact Of Credit Rating Announcements On CDS Spreads Of Banking Sector by Mavrommati, Thaleia
1 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF CREDIT RATING ANNOUNCEMENTS 
ON CDS SPREADS OF BANKING SECTOR. 
THALEIA MAVROMMATI 
INTERNATIONAL HELLENIC UNIVERSITY 
MSc. in Banking and Finance 
Abstract 
The main purpose of this work is twofold. First, we apply Event Study 
Methodology to CDS spreads of banking sector worldwide during the period 2006-
2011 in order to search for abnormal spread changes around credit rating 
announcements. Mainly, we are interested in whether CDS spreads anticipate official 
announcements by S&P and Moody’s.  Second, we aim to verifying that CDS 
conditional volatility estimated by the E-GARCH model produces powerful results in 
the Event Study by accounting for heteroscedastic abnormal spread changes in the 
banking sector.  
Overall, we find that banking sector CDS spreads heavily anticipate negative credit 
rating announcements and especially effective downgrades up to three months 
before. In addition, strong post announcement abnormal spread reaction is 
observed after negative events. Finally, we reveal that CDS spread changes can be 
influenced by the rating class and geographical origin of banks as well as by the 
credit rating agency that releases the rating announcement. As far as conditional 
volatility is concerned, it accounts for the pronounced persistence variance effect in 
banking sector and sufficiently reflects the CDS variance behavior around abnormal 
spread changes. 
Keywords: Credit Default Swaps, Banking Sector, Event Study Methodology, 
Exponential GARCH Model 
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1. Introduction 
  Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are growing demand derivatives of bond insurance 
that are traded in Over The Counter (OTC). The demand of those swaps is being 
increased as long as more uncertainty characterizes corporate and sovereign bonds. 
Especially during financial crisis when the default probabilities for the reference 
entities are increasing in number, there are many hedgers or even speculators in CDS 
market that trade credit risk with those instruments.  
  CDS is a contract between two counterparties in order to exchange credit risk of 
a bond issuer (reference entity of CDS contract). Basically, the two parties of the 
agreement are the buyer and seller of protection who buy and sell insurance for a 
credit default event of the reference entity. The protection buyer pays periodic 
coupons (CDS spread) to the protection seller and benefits if the reference entity 
faces a credit event such as a default or its credit quality lowers. Whether a credit 
event occurs the protection buyer can sell the bond of the reference entity to the 
protection seller for its face value.  Otherwise, the protection buyer looses the 
amount paid to periodic coupons for the specific time interval and the CDS contract 
expires. The protection seller from his perspective receives the periodic coupons and 
benefits if the reference entity continues normally operating or its credit quality 
improves. 
  Essentially, CDS spread is the price of the contract that is paid either annually or 
semiannually for the specific time frame of the contract. Spreads are quoted in bps 
and reflect a percentage of the notional amount. For example, a CDS spread of 200 
bps paid annually that is 2% for a bond with a face value of $15,000,000 results in an 
annual coupon payment of $300,000. The amount paid ensures the right to sell the 
reference bond for $15 millions whether a credit event of the reference entity 
occurs.  
  In this work, we are interested in investigating the impact of credit rating 
announcements on CDS spreads since reference entity’s credit quality constitutes a 
significant determinant of CDS spread. As long as the creditworthiness of the 
reference entity worsens therefore risk increases, CDS quotes also increase and vice 
versa. The interest on this relationship is found in whether CDS market responds to a 
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new credit rating announcement or anticipates it some days or even months before, 
therefore whether CDS market is efficient or not. Strong evidence in literature 
suggests that credit rating announcements reflect information that is already 
adjusted to spreads. Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) clearly observe anticipation of 
negative credit rating announcements that results from significant abnormal spread 
reaction preceding the announcement. 
  It is worth noting that credit rating announcements are released by the three 
Credit Rating Agencies of Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch. CRAs 
extensively evaluate bonds issued by corporations or governments (sovereign debt) 
and provide an opinion of their creditworthiness. CRAs may publish three types of 
credit rating announcements which are the effective or actual ratings, reviews 
(watch listings) and outlooks. Since effective rating results in the actual change of an 
entity’s level of credit rating, a review is an indication statement of a possible change 
in the current credit quality of the reference entity. It can be either a review for an 
upgrade or downgrade of the reference entity and fully explains whether the 
particular actual rating change should be done. Whereas, the outlook is a report 
similar to equity analyst report that provides a forecast of entity’s future credit 
rating. Some recent literature examines the confidence of market participants 
toward CRAs. Interestingly, Castellano and Scaccia (2012) illustrate that CRAs are not 
a reliable source of information for market traders during financial crisis.  
We contribute to the literature by examining a specific part of the CDS market 
such as the banking sector which is considerably sensitive toward credit rating 
announcements. In general, market traders are being informed by public information 
such as rating announcements, annual reports etc. as well as by private information. 
The basic reason of this inside information trading in the particular case is that banks 
can be lenders as well as CDS traders at the same time which imply that information 
can be easily available to borrowers. Another reason that the banking sector is quite 
interesting is that it is characterized by contagion effects that can seriously affect the 
creditworthiness of a bank even if it is safe and sound. In practice, we reproduce the 
methodology of Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2013) on a different dataset and we 
derive some interesting results. This particular methodology involves the estimation 
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of the CDS volatility by the Exponential model and then its usage to the Event Study 
Methodology in order to indicate more accurate CDS market signals. 
  Our research question aims to verify whether anticipation effects around credit 
rating announcements are observed in banking sector's CDS spreads. Second, we are 
motivated to identify the credit rating agency that market participants rely on most. 
Third, whether European/non European banks or A rated banks/B rated banks cause 
different impacts on CDS abnormal spread changes. Finally, whether CDS abnormal 
spread conditional volatility portrays significant abnormal spread changes in the 
banking sector around credit rating announcements. 
  The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 a relevant literature in credit 
rating announcements is reviewed; Section 3 describes the data set; Section 4 
describes the methodology; Section 5 cites the research findings; Section 6 reports 
some research limitations; finally Section 7 draws the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
  Prior research is based on Standard Event Study Methodology in an attempt to 
measure the impact of credit rating announcements on CDS spreads (Goh & 
Ederington, 1993; Norden & Weber, 2004). This methodology implies the 
examination of abnormal CDS spread changes based on the assumption of 
unconditional variance in spreads that recommends a non volatile CDS market 
around credit rating announcements. One would expect that the condition of 
constant volatility in spreads may create biases in the results. Alternatively, assuming 
conditional variance in CDS spreads there is observed heteroskedasticity that is 
explained by large abnormal spread changes around credit rating events which in 
turn can lead variance to persist for many days thereafter. Castellano and D’Ecclesia 
(2013) introduce the conditional volatility methodology in Event Study in order to 
produce more accurate market signals around credit rating events. 
  While CDS market data is recently available, the initial thought of researchers 
was to examine stock and bond market response to credit rating announcements. 
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992); Steiner and Heinke (2001) study excess bond 
and stock returns as a consequence of effective ratings and watch listings. 
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Pronounced bond and stock price reaction is observed for downgrades and negative 
watch listings. The sensitivity of bond price over an announcement depends on the 
current yield level, the probability of default of the issuer, the type or even the 
nationality of the issuer. Such as, corporate bonds present higher price sensitivity 
than government bonds and US bonds seem to overreact in rating announcements. 
Similarly, the price reaction of below investment grade bonds is even more 
pronounced than investment grade bonds.  
  There are additional studies that consider bond market; Hite and Warga (1997) 
finds bond price anticipation effect on downgrades. In fact, significant abnormal 
performance is observed 6 months before downgrades. Katz (1974) finds no 
anticipation effect but he observes bond abnormal returns 6 to 10 weeks after 
downgrades.  On the other hand, Weinstein (1977) finds neither abnormal returns 
before downgrades nor afterwards.  
  Goh and Ederington (1993) investigates common stock response over negative 
bond rating reclassifications. They consider that common stock price increases in 
case that bond is forecasted to be downgraded due to an increase in leverage. 
Instead, any negative information about firm’s revenues results in the decrease of 
common stock price. Applying Standard Event Study Methodology, they prove that 
stock market responds abnormally only to downgrades due to firm’s bad financial 
performance which may negatively affect the stock price. On the other hand, there is 
no significant stock market reaction to downgrades that imply positive impact on 
stock prices.  
  In general, the common conclusion of either stock, bond or credit market is that 
they significantly respond to negative credit rating announcements.  But there is no 
market that shows similar in magnitude significant reaction in positive rating events 
as well. Various techniques are applied to CDS in order to further contribute to event 
effects detection. Norden and Weber (2004) investigate the impact of credit rating 
announcements on both CDS spreads and stock prices. By applying Standard Event 
Study Methodology they conclude that both markets present significant anticipation 
effects around negative reviews and effective downgrades. Especially for the stock 
market, significant abnormal performance is also found right around the event date 
of negative rating events but no significant abnormal stock returns are found around 
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positive events at all. Between the two markets credit market responds earlier to 
credit rating events than stock market. Additionally, both markets can be influenced 
by the level of previous ratings or the preceding credit rating events, though CDS 
market is mostly affected by a new credit rating. 
  The research objective of Hull et al. (2004) is to examine the relationship 
between bond yields and credit default swap spreads and then the impact of credit 
rating announcements on these CDS spreads. The bootstrap technique is applied 
(Efron & Tibshirani, 1994) by testing whether the mean adjusted CDS spreads 
produce significant signals around an event. It is concluded that the market fully 
anticipates negative effective ratings, reviews and outlooks. On the other hand, 
there is much less anticipation of positive announcements. Also there is no post 
announcement effect which implies that rating announcements reflect information 
that is already discounted by previous spread changes.  The important information 
that reviews for downgrade convey, is also highlighted. Interestingly, the probability 
of whether a credit rating announcement will occur is also examined. Thus, CDS 
spreads reveal significant information and approximately 50% of the negative 
effective ratings, reviews and outlooks are explained by the top CDS spread changes. 
  Micu, Remolona, and Wooldridge (2004) investigate the price impact of 
downgrades, negative reviews and negative outlooks to CDS market. They found 
significant large anticipation and announcement effects to both downgrades and 
negative reviews while much less in magnitude effects are reported for negative 
outlooks. They observe also that CDS spreads of investment grade bonds are the 
most sensitive to the impacts of negative rating events. 
  Norden (2008) uses public information and proxies of private information 
concerning CDS underlyings in order to search both for announcement and 
anticipation effects in CDS spreads of international firms. He results on that spreads 
significantly respond to effective downgrades but the effect is even more powerful 
to negative reviews. Meanwhile, significant anticipation effects are found to 
negative reviews while even stronger anticipation impacts are observed to effective 
downgrades this time. He also reveals that the higher the general coverage media of 
a firm the larger the CDS response is. Concerning private information about CDS 
underlyings, it is reflected in the market only around negative credit rating events 
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and concerns anticipation effects in CDS spreads that increase in magnitude as long 
as the number of bank lenders of a CDS underlying increases. 
  Castellano and Scaccia (2012) prove that CDS quotes and their volatility are more 
pronounced before negative rating announcements, verifying that CDS spreads 
anticipate negative rating events.  The proposed methodology to this work is a 
Hidden Markov Model with two regimes (low and high volatility) that is incorporated 
to Standard Event Study Methodology in order to solve the problem of ignoring 
heteroskedasticity in standardized Abnormal Returns series      . In particular, 
HMM considers state-dependent means and variances to indicate anticipation of 
CDS market for rating announcements.  Additionally, they compare CDS spread 
abnormal performance before and during financial crisis. Market participants lack of 
confidence for the Credit Rating Agencies especially during periods of high volatility. 
  Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2013) conclude that CDS quotes respond to credit 
rating announcements mainly around the event dates but reviews are also 
anticipated months before.  Their analysis becomes even more accurate by 
introducing the importance of E-GARCH model as analytical tool that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity in CDS spreads. Together with a large change in CDS quote around 
an event, high CDS volatility is expected that requires some days to fade away and 
return to its normal level. 
3. Data Set 
  The data set is entirely collected from Bloomberg database and it consists of 5 
year1 CDS daily composite quotes that refer to senior unsecured debt obligation. In 
addition, credit rating announcements as released by the two international Rating 
Agencies of Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s2 are included as well. The sample period 
ranges from 2006 to 2011. 
  CDS daily composite spreads are provided by pricing sources such as CMAL, 
CMAN, CBIL, and CMAI and are quoted as “Px_Last” in USD. Essentially, these 
                                                             
1 The most liquid CDS contracts are those of 5 year maturity. Although there are contracts with 
maturity ranging from 6 months to 30 years, they usually lack of spread data. 
2 Credit rating history of Fitch is not included in the research sample while it follows the same rating 
system with S&P. 
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spreads derive from daily bid / ask spread as a mid price. As far as the composite is 
concerned, it requires a minimum amount of liquidity in order to generate a table 
rate and this threshold recently has been crossed. In this event, the composite 
automatically stops generating a price because there is not enough confidence in the 
rate that would be produced otherwise. 
  CDS are referenced to entities from banking sector in Europe, USA, Australia and 
Asia (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and India). Following some data quality 
restrictions, CDS should provide observed spread data in both Estimation Period 
     and Event Window (EW) of each credit rating announcement. In particular, at 
least 50% in EP (110 trading days between -170 and -61) and 95% in EW (81 trading 
days between -60 and 20), should be observed quotes. For this reason, 43 banks of 
the initial sample of 53 banks are finally used in the empirical analysis (Table 1). Note 
that whether some CDS spreads are not available in the EP or EW because of 
illiquidity they are considered constant till a new spread change arises3. As a further 
restriction, the time series are allowed to include 15% zero spread changes at most. 
The final data of CDS quotes consists of 84,711 observed daily quotes and 
considering the derived data 86,795 quotes are examined. That means 2.4% of these 
quotes is derived data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 That was proposed by Castellano and Scaccia (2012) in their research paper “CDS and Rating 
Announcements: changing signaling during financial crisis? “. 
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Table 1 - Sample of Banks 
  Credit rating history is also obtained from Bloomberg with priority to the 
description that could best reflect the creditworthiness of banks. The following order 
is considered for Moody’s: 1. Issuer Rating, 2. Senior Unsecured Debt, 3. Long term 
Rating. While for S&P Long Term Foreign Issuer Credit best describes the whole 
sample. 
  Essentially, two different credit rating systems are used in order to describe the 
credit quality of reference entities. Standard and Poor’s (S&P) classifies bonds to 
seven main categories of AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC. Further classification of 
TICKER BANK CURRENT RATING - S&P ORIGIN
1 ALLY US Equity ALLY FINANCIAL INC B+ USA
2 AXP US Equity AMERICAN EXPRESS CO BBB+ USA
3 ANZ AU Equity AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD. AA- AUSTRALIA
4 806257Z BB Equity AXA BANK EUROPE SA A BELGIUM
5 BMPS IM Equity BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI SIENA B ITALY
6 BNL IM Equity BANCA NAZIONALE LAVORO BBB ITALY
7 BBVA SM Equity BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTA (BBVA) BBB- SPAIN
8 BCP PL Equity BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES B PORTUGAL
9 BP IM Equity BANCO POPOLARE SCARL BB ITALY
10 SAN SM Equity BANCO SANTANDER SA BBB SPAIN
11 BAC US Equity BANK OF AMERICA CORP BBB+ USA
12 3988 HK Equity BANK OF CHINA LTD. A HONG KONG
13 BKIR ID Equity BANK OF IRELAND BB+ IRELAND
14 8315 JP Equity BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI UFJ LTD. A+ JAPAN
15 BARC LN Equity BARCLAYS PLC A LONDON
16 BLGZ GR Equity BAYERISCHE LANDESBANK A GERMANY
17 BNP FP Equity BNP PARIBAS A+ FRANCE
18 FBAVP BB Equity BNP PARIBAS FORTIS SA A+ BELGIUM
19 C US Equity CITIGROUP INC A USA
20 CBK GR Equity COMMERZBANK AG A- GERMANY
21 CBA AU Equity COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA AA- AUSTRALIA
22 ACA FP Equity CREDIT AGRICOLE SA A FRANCE
23 CSGN VX Equity CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG A- SWITZERLAND
24 DBK GR Equity DEUTSCHE BANK AG A GERMANY
25 GS US Equity GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC A- USA
26 ICICI IN Equity ICICI BANK LTD. BBB- INDIA
27 024110 KS Equity INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA (IBK) A+ SOUTH KOREA
28 ISP IM Equity INTESA SANPAOLO BBB ITALY
29 JPM US Equity JP MORGAN CHASE & CO A USA
30 060000 KS Equity KOOKMIN BANK A SOUTH KOREA
31 KDBZ KS Equity KOREA DEVELOPMENT BANK (KDB) A SOUTH KOREA
32 8411 JP Equity MIZUHO FINANCIAL GROUP INC. A- JAPAN
33 MS US Equity MORGAN STANLEY A USA
34 NAB AU Equity NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. AA- AUSTRALIA
35 RBS LN Equity ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP A- LONDON
36 ANL LN Equity SANTANDER UK PLC A LONDON
37 GLE FP Equity SOCIETE GENERALE A FRANCE
38 STAN LN Equity STANDARD CHARTERED PLC A+ LONDON 
39 8318 JP Equity SUMITAMO MITSUI BANKING CORPORATION A+ JAPAN
40 UBSN VX Equity UBS AG A SWITZERLAND
41 UCG IM Equity UNICREDIT S.p.A. BBB ITALY
42 WFC US Equity WELLS FARGO & CO A+ USA
43 WBC AU Equity WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION AA- AUSTRALIA
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AA category is AA+, AA, and AA-; similarly A category turns into A+, A, and A- and so 
on. Moody’s corresponding main rating categories are Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and 
Caa. Then comes the division of Aa category into Aa1, Aa2, and Aa3; also A becomes 
A1, A2, and A3 and etc. For any bond that is rated above BBB- or Baa3, there is 
certainty that the entity will fulfill its obligations. These bonds are called investment 
grade bonds and are high demand bonds that bear little fear of default. Also, there 
are bonds rated below investment grade bonds named speculative or “junk” bonds 
and are characterized by high probability of default. 
  The obtained credit rating history initially included 404 credit rating 
announcements (both reviews and effective ratings). Though, taking into 
consideration the lack of spreads at some event dates and the contamination effect 
that overlapped events can cause, the announcements are considerably reduced to 
146 for the final sample. What we call overlapped events is when both CRAs release 
simultaneous rating announcements for a particular bank, or when multiple event 
types fell into the same    and EW. In order to avoid contamination in the sample, 
we analyze those EP and EW that include only one event type starting always from 
the first event for each bank.  
In fact, 50% of rating history refers to both negative and positive reviews, while 
the rest 50% includes both effective downgrades and upgrades. Interestingly, 91 
announcements describe negative events while 55 describe positive events. Possibly, 
this higher number of downgrades (63%) is attributed to financial crisis period that 
has been included in research. Taking also into account that Asia presents greater 
number of positive events compared to Europe, the latter is characterized by 
multiple downgrades especially in post crisis period.  
  It is worth noting that CDS quotes significantly increase during post crisis period, 
reaching a mean of 200 bps in 2012. As it is already mentioned, CDS spreads indicate 
the credit quality of entities and they increase as long as the creditworthiness of the 
last lowers. Generally, spreads can take much higher prices such as 10 or 15 times 
more than the particular mean quote. Such quotes usually refer to entities that are 
likely to default in the very short term and only one coupon payment usually occurs. 
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4. Methodology 
  4.1. Event Study Methodology 
  There are two aspects of Event Study Methodology that are used in literature for 
measuring stock and bond abnormal returns and more recently CDS abnormal 
spreads. Standard Event Study Methodology is the first one that searches for 
abnormal spread changes by assuming constant variance in spreads. Alternatively, 
the idea of incorporating conditional variance methodology in Event Study seems to 
account for time varying volatility that is driven by some important factors. For 
example, volatility may increase together with an increase in abnormal spreads due 
to deterioration of bank’s credit quality or it can be affected by previous volatilities 
in abnormal spreads as well. 
  We apply Event Study Methodology together with the E-GARCH model in order 
to account for the heteroscedastic CDS spreads. We expect that significant abnormal 
spreads will be detected around effective downgrades and negative reviews. In 
addition, anticipation effects are expected due to CDS market inefficiency to convey 
new information close to the event date and not before that. Concerning the           
E-GARCH model, it is supposed to model the dynamic of CDS conditional variance 
around credit rating announcements and indicate its accuracy as volatility measure 
in Event Study.  
  CDS spread changes are calculated to measure for the daily changes in spreads. 
There are two ways to create CDS spread changes, with the absolute measure or 
with the relative one. Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2013); Norden and Weber (2004); 
Hull et al. (2004) use the absolute spread measure in their research that requires the 
simple difference between two consecutive daily spreads (equation 1). 
                                               (1) 
  On the other hand, Callen, Livnat, and Segal (2009) consider the compounding 
effect in spreads by using the log differences (equation 2). 
                  –                        (2) 
  We also use the relative spread measure since it is the most appropriate to 
consider for previous impacts on credit quality and therefore on CDS spreads. 
Although both measures are applicable, the suitable one will depend on the size of 
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the effect that someone expects from a rating event to have on the credit risk of the 
entity. Since the banking sector is considerably sensitive toward credit quality 
announcements, we expect pronounced spread reaction. 
  In order to examine for event effects on CDS spreads the main idea is to 
calculate spread abnormal performance by comparing daily spread changes around 
the event date with a benchmark (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 for abnormal spread 
changes). Two fundamental normal spread change models exist in the literature of 
Event Study Methodology; these are the Mean Adjusted model and the Market 
model. As far as the former is concerned, it requires to:  
 Identify credit rating event dates. 
 Define the Estimation Period      for each event of which the mean value 
of spread changes will be the benchmark        of daily spread changes. 
 Define the Event Window      of which the abnormal spread changes 
will be measured. 
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Figure 1 - Abnormal spread changes around positive review (Bank of China) 
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Figure 2 - Abnormal spread changes around effective downgrade (Barclays Plc. Bank) 
 
  We define the abnormal spread change for each time   in the    of entity   as 
the difference of daily spread change with the benchmark of the relative    
(equation 3). 
              –                                       (3) 
Following Brown and Warner (1985) who measure abnormal stock returns 
through the Mean Adjusted model, the benchmark of spreads around a particular 
event should be determined by the “normal behavior” of the Estimation Period 
preceding this event (equation 4).  
       
 
   
      
   
      
 
              (4) 
  The Market Model though, is an improvement of Mean Adjusted model that relates 
the abnormal spreads of any relevant security         to the abnormal spreads of 
market portfolio         . Thus, the benchmark in that case is represented by the 
CDS market index. Equation 5 illustrates the abnormal spread changes from the 
Market Model: 
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                                              (5) 
          
              
  Where      is the disturbance term with zero mean, and        and  
      are the 
model parameters. 
Among the two, Market Adjusted Model is applied in the particular Event Study to 
examine for abnormal behavior in CDS spreads. 
  We consider the time interval of [-170, -61] for the EP that is 110 days before 
the EW and 170 days before the event date. Concerning the EW, a time interval of          
[-60, +20] is determined which concerns the 81 days before, around and after the 
event date. In particular, the EW is divided into     subintervals for each                    
              to examine for anticipation or rating event effects.  
 Anticipation effects are found in the following subintervals of the event 
window:                                            . 
 Announcement effects are observed in             . 
 Post announcement effects are detected in              . 
  In order to search for significant abnormal spread changes we need to calculate 
Cumulative Abnormal Spreads          by totaling the abnormal spread changes in 
the    and for each subinterval. Then the Cross Sectional           accounts for the 
average     of each subinterval, across events. Thus, we follow the equations 6 and 
7: 
                
    
 
                                                                             (6) 
          
         
 
 
   
 
                                                                              (7) 
where  is the number of events in sample. 
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 4.2. Accounting for Heteroskedasticity in abnormal spread changes. 
  The assumption of homoskedastic residuals is relaxed by assuming no constant 
abnormal spread variance around credit rating announcements. The E-GARCH 
model is performed to abnormal spread changes in order to estimate their 
conditional variance around credit rating events.  
  Generally,       family models allow the incorporation of “volatility clustering” 
while they consider current conditional volatility to be depended not only on 
immediately previous squared errors but on previous conditional variances too. 
Essentially,       model (Bollerslev, 1986) can explain the variance behavior during 
financial crisis period when the market is quite volatile.  Thus, volatility clustering 
refers to the ability of large spread changes to follow large spread changes and small 
spread changes to follow small ones. As a result, there is positive correlation 
between current level of volatility and preceding period. In addition,       models 
imply that excess volatility that is volatility above to the average historical level will 
be reduced along time to its long run mean level. Similarly, low levels of volatility will 
increase in their higher average historical levels.  
  The important extension of       model that is used in this research is the      
E-GARCH by Nelson (1991). Other GARCH models could also explain spreads 
behavior such as the GJR - GARCH model (Glosten, Jagannathan, & Runkle, 1993) 
which considers also possible asymmetries. But, the comparative advantage of an   
E-GARCH is that it already entails non negativity constraints. Thus, fitted volatility 
will always be positive regardless the sign of the tested parameters in the model. The 
incorporation of non negativity is allowed through the logarithm of the variance that 
the model introduces. Also, E-GARCH considers of asymmetry through    model 
parameter that allows volatility to be asymmetrically affected by large negative or 
positive spread changes. Note that the relationship between volatility and spreads is 
negative when    parameter is negative and positive when    parameter is positive.  
  The specification of E-GARCH (1, 1) is performed (see equation 8) with a null 
hypothesis that examines whether the   vector of model parameters equals to 
zero                      . 
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  Assuming that abnormal spread changes are conditionally 
heteroscedastic                       : 
 
                     
                  
      
       
      
      
       
                                      (8) 
  What the independent variables do explain is that conditional variance on time t 
may be affected by the size of previous day abnormal spreads (   GARCH 
coefficient), the sign of previous day abnormal spreads (   asymmetry coefficient) 
and the previous day conditional variance (  volatility clustering coefficient). 
Generally, the E-GARCH volatility model is expected to provide the most valid 
description of abnormal spreads variance (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 for conditional 
variance behavior). 
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Figure 3 - Conditional variance around positive review (Bank of China) 
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Figure 4 - Conditional variance around effective downgrade (Barclays Plc. Bank) 
4.3. Statistical hypothesis tests  
  As long as the appropriate measure of spread changes and the normal spread 
changes model have been selected, the specification of a good test statistic follows. 
Following Brown and Warner (1985), a cross sectional t test statistic is used other 
than the simple t statistic. The variance      of abnormal spread changes is 
approximated by the E-GARCH model series and the cross sectional t statistic can be 
defined by equation 9. 
   
           
  
                   
          
                                                                (9) 
The cross sectional variance of           is given by equation 10.  
                 
 
 
           
 
   
 
                                                                  (10) 
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where 
            
 
   
     
    
 
                                                                               (11) 
And    is the number of days within each subinterval. 
  The above t statistic follows the normal distribution with     degrees of 
freedom (  is the number of events). The null hypothesis is that the abnormal 
spread changes equal to zero under the assumption of no abnormal performance 
(            ). The rejection of the null hypothesis through a two tailed test means 
that we accept the non directional alternative hypothesis of having significant 
abnormal spread changes (                         ).  
  Generally, the disadvantage of a simple t statistic is that it may produce 
inaccurate inferences due to the event induced heteroskedasticity in spread 
changes. Alternatively, the cross sectional t statistic approximates the variance of 
abnormal spreads in the Event Window cross sectionally in order to correct for event 
induced variance. The accuracy of this test assumes that the abnormal spreads are 
cross sectionally independent thus the event dates across banks do not overlap.  
  The construction of the cross sectional t test involves the cross sectional average 
Cumulative Abnormal Spreads (    ) and the cross sectional average Conditional 
Variances (   ) of abnormal spreads which are estimated on the cross section of 
Event Windows. Note that a well specified test requires the assumption of normal 
distribution in large samples. Though, there are some event subsamples in the 
particular Event Study that are quite small. In this event, relative information about 
the population parameters is not known and data is not normally distributed.  
  According to the descriptive statistics of abnormal spread changes there is 
evidence of substantial skewness and excess kurtosis. Some series are positive 
skewed and some negative skewed - Figure 5 and Figure 6 present two examples of 
positive and negative skewness in the time series respectively - (p value given by 
Jarque-Bera normality test equals to zero with six decimal places). For the time 
series that normality assumptions do not hold, the distribution is always leptokurtic 
with fat tails and more peaked than normal distribution. On the other hand, there 
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are few time series that follow the normal distribution with zero skewness and zero 
excess kurtosis (which is the same as kurtosis that equals to 3) - Figure 7 reports an 
example of normally distributed residuals - (Jarque-Bera p value is higher than 0.05).  
 
Figure 5 - Positive skewness and excess kurtosis in time series (Bank of China) 
 
Figure 6 - Negative skewness and excess kurtosis in time series (Barclays Bank Plc) 
 
Figure 7 - Normal Distribution with zero skewness and kurtosis equal to 3 in time series 
(Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argenta) 
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  Despite the ambiguous characteristics of abnormal spreads, we expect that 
cumulative abnormal spreads will provide a roughly normal distribution as long as 
the number of time series to the sample increases. Even in case of small samples, the 
indication of normality in abnormal spreads by some time series leads to the 
assumption that the parametric t test will provide both a good statistical hypothesis 
testing and quantitative statement. 
  For robustness purposes, a non parametric test - Generalized Sign Test         
proposed by Cowan (1992) - is performed. The particular non parametric test 
considers the signs of daily spread changes by testing whether half of the cumulative 
abnormal spreads in each subinterval are positive by chance. The comparative 
advantage of that test is that it solves the problem of small samples since the strict 
assumption of normally distributed residuals is not required and binomial 
distribution is considered. Though, the serious problem that may arise is that it can 
be not well specified in cases that the research aims not just to hypothesis testing 
but to estimation also. The generalized sign test loses information by ignoring the 
magnitude of abnormal spread changes and considering only for the signs. For 
example, for the banking sector that it is expected to present significant large 
abnormal spread changes, the generalized sign test probably will present low 
rejection rates and will often accept a false null hypothesis                . 
  As a result, whether the non parametric test draws the same conclusions with 
the parametric test then we should be confident twice for the accuracy of 
parametric t test results. Alternatively, a great discrepancy between the 
recommended results by the two tests will increase confidence over the parametric t 
test. The reason is that the t test is more powerful than the sign test while it conveys 
important information for the parameters. A combined analysis of both parametric 
and non parametric testing is commonly used in literature of Event Studies in order 
to enhance the quality of inferences; also a comparative study of the power of 
statistical results is widely examined (Corrado & Zivney, 1992; Kolari & Pynnonen, 
2011; Norden & Weber, 2004; Steiner & Heinke, 2001). 
  The generalized sign test translates positive and negative abnormal spreads 
changes to positive and negative signs respectively. It compares the number of 
positive signs in the Event Window with the proportion of positive signs in the 
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Estimation Period - period of “normal behavior”. The generalized sign test statistic is 
given by equation 12.  
    
     
             
 
  
 
                                                                 (12) 
  Where w is the number of events in the    for which the Cumulative Abnormal 
Spreads are positive,   is the number of events examined in the test and    is the 
binomial distribution of positive abnormal spreads in 110 days of the    that is given 
by equation 13. 
    
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
      
   
   
 
                                                                              (13) 
where 
       
            
                     
  
 
  Cowan (1992) illustrates that z test statistic can be used for statistical hypothesis 
testing as a normal approximation of binomial distribution in large samples. The null 
hypothesis of the generalized sign test states that the number of positive cumulative 
abnormal spreads is equal to 50% under the hypothesis of no abnormal performance 
(          ). The alternative hypothesis of a non directional two tailed test implies 
that there is abnormal spread performance             .  
5. Findings 
  In the first part of this section, we report the results for the response of banking 
sector CDS abnormal spreads to effective ratings and reviews by S&P and Moody’s. 
We carry out the parametric t test and the non parametric z generalized sign test on 
the whole event sample. Also, tests for subgroups of credit rating events are 
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reported by event type, rating class, rating agency and geographical origin4. 
Interestingly, the empirical results between the particular parametric and non 
parametric test propose different event effects. Though, there is much more 
confidence to make inferences on the results of the parametric t test in the 
particular data since it can provide additional information for the parameters. For 
purposes of completeness, the results of the non parametric z test are also 
presented in tables. In the second part of this section, we model the abnormal 
spread conditional variance through the E-GARCH volatility model in order to draw 
important conclusions about its behavior around credit rating announcements. Then, 
the contribution of conditional variance in event effects detection is examined by 
analyzing its response in the presence of significant abnormal spread performance.   
5.1. Abnormal Spreads Detection 
  
 
Table 2 reports CDS response to effective upgrades (Panel A), effective 
downgrades (Panel B), negative reviews (Panel C) and positive reviews (Panel D) on 
each event time subinterval. We calculate the average of cumulative abnormal 
spreads        across banks in each subinterval and perform a cross sectional t test 
and z generalized sign test to observe whether the abnormal spreads are different 
than zero. We are interested in verifying the hypothesis that CDS market apart from 
the abnormal spread reaction that it may have on the announcement day, also 
anticipates a rating announcement at some point in time before the event date. 
  Panel A ( Table 2) proposes that the average cumulative abnormal spreads 
(ACAS) of banks around effective upgrades is significantly different than zero in     
           subintervals. This finding implies that CDS spreads anticipate upgrades 
between 40 to 2 days before the event and then spreads continue to react 
abnormally right around the announcement day. Also, post announcement effect is 
observed 2 days after upgrades and for 20 days thereafter. The size of ACASs for 
these event time subintervals fluctuates between to 1.4% and 3.2% with the highest 
magnitude be presented 20 days before the announcement day. On the other hand, 
                                                             
4 For the subgroups by rating class, rating agency and geographical origin I report results for effective 
downgrades, effective upgrades and negative reviews. Tests on positive reviews for these subgroups 
are not performed, since the sample size is considered quite small and the inferences would be 
inaccurate. 
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Panel D reports that the ACAS of banks around positive reviews is found to be 
statistically significant in   ,            subintervals with abnormal spread changes that 
fluctuate between the same range as upgrades, but with the most important 
abnormal spread change this time be presented the days around the event date. As 
a result, we further conclude that banking sector CDS spreads anticipate positive 
reviews between 60 to 40 days and then 20 days before the event date. Additionally, 
spreads heavily react the days around the announcement and continue their 
abnormal reaction even 20 days thereafter. 
  Panel B and Panel C reveal that negative events impose the highest impact on 
banking sector CDS spreads. Panel B suggests that the ACAS of banks around 
effective downgrades is statistically significant in all event time subintervals with an 
ACAS that ranges between 2.7% to 13.5%. That means, CDS spreads anticipate 
downgrades during all 60 days before the event date and spreads also continue the 
abnormal performance during the announcement day and the 20 days following.        
Based on the size of ACASs, downgrades seem to affect CDS spread changes the 
most. Interestingly, the huge spread reaction of -13.5% is detected between 40 to 20 
days before downgrades. Alternatively, Panel C reveals that the statistical significant 
ACASs around negative reviews are presented in   ,              with the highest 
average cumulative abnormal spreads of -5.7% and -5.2% be reported between 60 to 
40 days before and 20 days after the announcement day respectively. We conclude 
that bank CDS spreads anticipate negative reviews between 60 to 20 days before and 
then they continue to react abnormally around the announcement day. Also, heavy 
post announcement effect is observed after negative reviews. 
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5 6
Table 2 - The impact of credit rating announcements in whole sample 
 
  Banks deriving from different geographical areas suggest different abnormal 
spread reaction around credit rating announcements. Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 
present the results of significance tests around upgrades, downgrades and negative 
reviews respectively for European and non European banks.  
                                                             
5 The great difference between the results of t test and z generalized sign test probably is explained 
by the magnitude of abnormal spread changes that t test also accounts for. 
6 Statistical significance of ACAS in each subinterval is denoted by I* at 10% significance level, I** at 
5% significance level and I*** at 1% significance level. The lower the level of significance, the higher is 
the statistical significance of ACAS. Thus, when ACAS is statistically significant at 1% significance level, 
it is also significant at 5% and 10% significance level. 
  I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 =  (+2,+20) 
Panel A: Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective upgrades(whole sample-43 series) 
ACAS 1.0444% 2.5499% -3.2086% -1.4420% 2.7868% 
t- test 1.67214 4.50533 -5.56253 -2.62957 4.71861 
(p-value) 0.10193 0.00005 0.00000 0.01190 0.00003 
  I1 I2*** I3*** I4** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 1.28059 0.97503 -1.77505 -2.99731 0.66946 
(p-value) 0.20034 0.32955 0.07589 0.00272 0.50320 
  I1 I2 I3* I4*** I5 
Panel B: Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective downgrades(whole sample-30 series) 
ACAS 2.6839% -13.4533% 4.7837% -3.4182% -6.3051% 
t- test 2.02125 -10.16287 4.09426 -2.87339 -5.92291 
(p-value) 0.05257 0.00000 0.00031 0.00752 0.00000 
  I1* I2*** I3*** I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 1.62055 -1.31378 0.88697 -1.31378 0.15339 
(p-value) 0.10511 0.18892 0.37510 0.18892 0.87809 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
Panel C: Average cumulative abnormal spreads around negative reviews(whole sample-61 series) 
ACAS -5.6612% -4.4432% 0.2884% 2.8304% -5.2128% 
t- test -8.52546 -7.22766 0.45832 4.41212 -7.96849 
(p-value) 0.00000 0.00000 0.64838 0.00004 0.00000 
  I1*** I2*** I3 I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test -0.56339 0.71704 1.22921 1.99747 0.20487 
(p-value) 0.57317 0.47335 0.21899 0.04577 0.83767 
  I1 I2 I3 I4** I5 
Panel D: Average cumulative abnormal spreads around positive reviews(whole sample-12 series) 
ACAS 2.9360% 1.8347% 3.3208% -3.4995% 3.4441% 
t- test 2.02503 1.60147 3.43190 -3.13097 3.21513 
(p-value) 0.06783 0.13758 0.00560 0.00956 0.00823 
  I1* I2 I3*** I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 0.77631 -0.96643 -0.38552 -1.54735 1.35723 
(p-value) 0.43756 0.33383 0.69986 0.12178 0.17471 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
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  Empirical evidence in Table 3 suggests a complete different impact of effective 
upgrades between European and non European bank CDS spreads. Panel A reports 
that for European banks anticipation effect is presented between 40 to 2 days 
before. Similarly, announcement effect is observed the days around the event, but 
no post announcement impact is detected for these banks. As expected, the ACAS in 
this panel is significantly different than zero only in      ,    subintervals with the 
highest percentage of cumulative abnormal spread changes of -4.6% be presented 
20 days before upgrades. Concerning non European bank, those anticipate upgrades 
between 60 to 40 days before. After that, again they respond abnormally in the post 
announcement window when the highest ACAS of 8.6% is observed. Note that, no 
announcement effect is detected for non European banks around upgrades. 
  Panel A and Panel B (Table 4) reveal that effective downgrades influence more 
the CDS spread changes of non European banks than of European ones. In particular, 
Panel A suggests that the ACAS for European banks is statistically different than zero 
in   ,       subintervals with a sizeable ACAS of 9.9% in the    event time interval. 
This evidence implies that European bank CDS spreads anticipate downgrades 
between 60 to 2 days before the announcement while no abnormal performance is 
found around the event date or the days thereafter. Panel B though, reports that the 
ACAS for non European banks significantly presents anticipation effect and both 
announcement and post announcement effect in CDS spread changes. It is 
interesting to note that an extreme ACASs of -25.5% for non European banks is 
observed between 40 to 20 days before the downgrades, while a similar one of 
15.6% is suggested for 20 days after the announcement day. 
  Inversely, Panel A and Panel B (Table 5) suggest that European banks when 
compared to non European ones are more affected by negative reviews. Panel A 
reports that the ACAS of European banks around negative reviews is statistically 
significant in all event time subintervals, implying abnormal spread reaction in pre-
event and both event and post-event periods. On the other hand, Panel B reports 
statistically significant ACASs in          subintervals, suggesting that non European 
banks anticipate negative reviews between 40 and 20 days before the 
announcement. Also, abnormal spread changes are detected right around and post 
the event date. Finally, the ACAS for both European and non European banks ranges 
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from 1.6% to 7.8% with the highest magnitude of abnormal spread changes be 
observed in the same subintervals as around effective downgrades; thus in     for 
European banks and        for non European banks. 
 
 
Table 3 - The impact of effective upgrades in Europe and World 
 
 
Table 4 - The impact of effective downgrades in Europe and World 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 =  (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective upgrades  
Panel A: 
Europe            
(28 series)  
ACAS -0.4808% 2.9154% -4.6007% -2.1331% -0.9175% 
t- test -0.52057 4.28791 -6.26129 -3.66174 -1.21048 
(p-value) 0.60691 0.00021 0.00000 0.00108 0.23659 
  I1 I2*** I3*** I4*** I5 
z- generalized sign test 1.33735 1.33735 -2.44437 -1.68802 0.20284 
(p-value) 0.18111 0.18111 0.01451 0.09141 0.83926 
  I1 I2 I3** I4* I5 
Panel B:  
World            
(15 series) 
ACAS 2.0386% 1.4513% 0.7329% -1.9104% 8.6171% 
t- test 1.78014 1.23527 0.57918 -1.43933 6.93510 
(p-value) 0.09676 0.23706 0.57167 0.17204 0.00001 
  I1* I2 I3 I4 I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 0.34017 -0.17954 0.34017 -2.77809 0.85988 
(p-value) 0.73373 0.85752 0.73373 0.00547 0.38985 
  I1 I2 I3 I4*** I5 
 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective downgrades      
Panel A:  
EUROPE        
(17 series) 
ACAS 9.8808% -4.2227% 4.9150% 0.5885% 0.8099% 
t- test 7.42630 -3.77893 3.49742 0.36135 0.53948 
(p-value) 0.00000 0.00164 0.00298 0.72257 0.59699 
  I1*** I2*** I3*** I4 I5 
z- generalized sign test 1.18184 -1.24358 -0.27341 -0.75850 1.66693 
(p-value) 0.23727 0.21365 0.78454 0.44815 0.09553 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5* 
Panel B: 
WORLD         
(13 series) 
ACAS -6.7275% -25.5242% 4.6120% -8.6576% -15.6093% 
t- test -2.66718 -9.51434 2.33756 -4.99776 -10.56902 
(p-value) 0.02052 0.00000 0.03755 0.00031 0.00000 
  I1** I2*** I3** I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 1.12905 -0.58006 1.69875 -1.14976 -1.71946 
(p-value) 0.25888 0.56187 0.08937 0.25024 0.08553 
  I1 I2 I3* I4 I5* 
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Table 5 - The impact of negative reviews in Europe and World 
 
  Various event effects are also found for credit rating announcements released by 
different rating agencies. Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 refer to the impacts of upgrades, 
downgrades and negative reviews to CDS spreads respectively, released by S&P and 
Moody’s.  
Panel A and Panel B (Table 6) reveal that S&P and Moody’s upgrades produce the 
lowest magnitude of abnormal spread changes that ranges from 0.2% to 7.1%, when 
compared to downgrades and negative reviews. Empirical evidence in Panel A 
suggests that the ACAS around S&P effective upgrades is statistically significant 
in   ,       event time intervals. As a result, banking sector CDS spreads anticipate 
S&P upgrades between 60 to 40 and 20 to 2 days before the announcement date 
and then spreads respond abnormally right around the event date. Note that, no 
post announcement effect is detected after S&P upgrades. Concerning Moody’s 
effective upgrades (Panel B), these present statistical significant ACAS in              
subintervals. That means, banking sector CDS spreads show a three month 
anticipation effect together with a post announcement effect after upgrades. Finally, 
no announcement effect is observed around Moody’s upgrades. It is important to 
mention that, both for S&P and Moody’s upgrades the highest abnormal spread 
change is recorded 60 days before the event date. 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20 ,-2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around negative reviews  
Panel A: 
EUROPE         
(41 series) 
ACAS -7.7686% -2.6993% 2.4261% 2.9684% -3.8875% 
t- test -10.15230 -3.72079 3.29164 3.89591 -5.38988 
(p-value) 0.00000 0.00061 0.00209 0.00036 0.00000 
  I1*** I2*** I3*** I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test -1.24120 -0.30391 0.94581 1.88310 -0.30391 
(p-value) 0.21453 0.76120 0.34424 0.05969 0.76120 
  I1 I2 I3 I4* I5 
Panel B: 
WORLD         
(20 series) 
ACAS -1.5518% -7.8440% -1.8439% 2.5613% -7.7971% 
t- test -1.19649 -6.88879 -1.45435 1.85462 -5.61926 
(p-value) 0.24622 0.00000 0.16217 0.07924 0.00002 
  I1 I2*** I3 I4* I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 0.79517 1.69227 0.79517 0.79517 0.79517 
(p-value) 0.42652 0.09059 0.42652 0.42652 0.42652 
  I1 I2* I3 I4 I5 
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  Panel A and Panel B (Table 7) illustrate different CDS response between S&P and 
Moody’s effective downgrades. Though, the magnitude of ACAS in both cases 
fluctuates to a similar range from 0.2% to 13.6%. Panel A suggests that S&P 
downgrades are reflected in the statistically significant ACAS in   ,          
subintervals. This evidence implies that banking sector CDS spreads anticipate S&P 
downgrades between 60 to 20 days before and then they react abnormally again 
close to the event date and for the 20 days following. On the other hand, Moody’s 
downgrades (Panel B) do not involve any announcement or post announcement 
effect in CDS spreads. Instead, significant ACAS is observed only in          
anticipation windows. 
  Panel A and Panel B (Table 8) reveal that the impact of negative reviews in 
banking sector CDS spreads is more pronounced when they are released by S&P 
credit rating agency. Panel A and Panel B report that the ACAS around S&P and 
Moody’s negative reviews is statistically significant in all anticipation windows and in 
both announcement and post announcement window. Though, the difference 
between the impacts of the two rating agencies is found on the size of abnormal 
spread changes that they can cause. Interestingly, S&P negative reviews present a 
higher range of ACAS that fluctuates between 4.8% and 15.2% while for Moody’s the 
ACAS fluctuates between 1.4% and 5.1%. Finally, S&P negative reviews introduce the 
highest abnormal spread change in    subinterval while Moody’s negative reviews do 
so in        subintervals. 
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Table 6 - The impact of effective upgrades announced by S&P and Moody’s 
 
 
Table 7 - The impact of effective downgrades announced by S&P and Moody’s 
 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective upgrades  
Panel A: 
Standard & 
Poor's             
(22 series) 
ACAS -5.9905% 1.4757% -2.2055% -3.8492% 1.6004% 
t- test -5.37373 1.60111 -2.01067 -3.89739 1.45542 
(p-value) 0.00002 0.12429 0.05738 0.00083 0.16034 
  I1*** I2 I3* I4*** I5 
z- generalized sign test -0.30689 1.40236 -1.16151 -2.87077 0.54774 
(p-value) 0.75893 0.16081 0.24543 0.00409 0.58387 
  I1 I2 I3 I4*** I5 
Panel B: 
Moody's      
(21 series) 
ACAS 7.0909% 3.3779% -3.3002% -0.1762% 3.2551% 
t- test 7.82215 4.38353 -4.88530 -0.26822 4.68935 
(p-value) 0.00000 0.00029 0.00009 0.79128 0.00014 
  I1*** I2*** I3*** I4 I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 2.14590 -0.03974 -1.35112 -1.35112 0.39739 
(p-value) 0.03188 0.96830 0.17666 0.17666 0.69108 
  I1** I2 I3 I4 I5 
 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective downgrades     
Panel A: 
Standard & 
Poor's           
(21 series) 
ACAS 9.3640% -13.6337% 1.6104% -4.9594% -8.3980% 
t- test 6.62704 -8.03285 1.44997 -3.93245 -7.29071 
(p-value) 0.00000 0.00000 0.16257 0.00082 0.00000 
  I1*** I2*** I3 I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 2.01871 -1.05324 1.14101 -1.49209 -0.17554 
(p-value) 0.04352 0.29223 0.25387 0.13567 0.86066 
  I1** I2 I3 I4 I5 
Panel B: 
Moody's        
(9 series) 
ACAS -12.9032% -13.0324% 12.1879% 0.1781% -1.4216% 
t- test -4.36958 -6.69667 4.19227 0.06702 -0.61361 
(p-value) 0.00238 0.00015 0.00303 0.94821 0.55651 
  I1*** I2*** I3*** I4 I5 
z- generalized sign test -0.12152 -0.78986 -0.12152 -0.12152 0.54682 
(p-value) 0.90328 0.42961 0.90328 0.90328 0.58450 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
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Table 8 - The impact of negative reviews announced by S&P and Moody’s 
 
Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11 report the impacts of upgrades, downgrades and 
negative reviews to banking sector CDS spreads by the rating class that the reference 
entities belong to. 
  Panel A and Panel B (Table 9) recommend that between A and B7 rated banks, the 
latter seems to be considerably influenced around effective upgrades. Panel A 
reports that the ACAS of A rated banks is statistically significant different than zero 
within the   ,    event time intervals, implying both an anticipation effect between 
40 to 20 days before upgrades and a post announcement effect for the 20 days 
thereafter. Panel B though, proposes that B rated banks start performing abnormally 
40 days before upgrades and till the 20 days after the event date. The ACAS in this 
case is statistically significant in   ,           subintervals and fluctuates between 0.1% 
and 5.9% with the highest abnormal performance being observed 20 days before the 
announcement date. Instead, the magnitude of abnormal spread changes for A rated 
banks ranges from 0.5% to 2.4% that is observed in the post announcement window. 
  On the contrary, Panel A and Panel B (Table 10) report that effective downgrades 
mostly affect A rated banks than B rated ones. Panel A supports this claim by 
presenting a significant ACAS in   ,           subintervals that fluctuates from 1.6% to 
                                                             
7 A and B rated categories refer to any bank that is rated in AAA or AA or A class and BBB or BB or B 
class respectively. 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around negative reviews  
Panel A: 
Standard & 
Poor's           
(18 series) 
ACAS -15.1914% -7.1425% 6.9450% 4.8068% -6.4689% 
t- test -9.35878 -5.00040 4.48036 2.88412 -4.09629 
(p-value) 0.00000 0.00011 0.00033 0.01030 0.00075 
  I1*** I2*** I3*** I4** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test -1.24381 1.11514 0.64335 1.58693 -0.77202 
(p-value) 0.21357 0.26479 0.52000 0.11253 0.44010 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
Panel B: 
Moody's      
(43 series) 
ACAS -1.4273% -5.1286% -1.5524% 1.9627% -4.2899% 
t- test -2.11430 -7.70055 -2.40733 2.92983 -6.39272 
(p-value) 0.04047 0.00000 0.02054 0.00546 0.00000 
  I1** I2*** I3** I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 0.13309 0.13309 1.04809 1.35308 0.74309 
(p-value) 0.89412 0.89412 0.29460 0.17603 0.45743 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
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19.8%. This evidence recommends that A rated bank CDS spreads anticipate 
downgrades 40 to 2 days before and then they continue to respond abnormally right 
around the announcement day and the 20 days thereafter. Underline that the 
pronounced ACASs of -19.8% and -10.4% are recorded between 40 to 20 days 
before and 20 days after the event date respectively. Alternatively, Panel B suggests 
for B rated banks only anticipation effects in   ,    subintervals while the ACAS 
ranges from 0.8% to 11.2% with the highest magnitude be presented 60 days before 
downgrades. No announcement or post announcement effect is observed for B rated 
banks around downgrades. 
  Panel A (Table 11) suggests that A rated banks anticipate negative reviews 
between 60 to 20 days before by reporting significant ACAS in   ,    subintervals. 
Additionally, significant ACAS is observed in        subintervals that imply both 
announcement and post announcement impact for A rated banks around negative 
reviews. As far as B rated banks are concerned, some evidence in Panel B suggests 
that they anticipate negative reviews just between 40 to 20 days before. For B rated 
banks also, significant abnormal spread response is detected in both announcement 
and post announcement windows. It is interesting to mention that pronounced 
abnormal spread performance for A rated banks is found in both anticipation and 
post announcement windows.  For B rated banks though, it is detected only in 
anticipation window. As a result, we further conclude that A rated banks again seem 
to be more sensitive toward negative reviews than B rated banks. Probably, the 
reason that A rated bank CDS spreads are characterized by high sensitivity toward 
negative events is that investors are concerned about whether those banks, 
especially during financial crisis period, can become fallen angels. 
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Table 9 - The impact of effective upgrades in A and B rated Banks 
 
 
Table 10 - The impact of effective downgrades in A and B rated Banks 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective upgrades    
Panel A:       
A Rated     
(29 series) 
ACAS 0.5294% 2.2998% -1.2297% -1.2280% 2.4323% 
t- test 0.53798 2.88676 -1.43600 -1.60857 2.82812 
(p-value) 0.59484 0.00742 0.16208 0.11893 0.00855 
  I1 I2*** I3 I4 I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 0.32443 0.69617 -0.79079 -2.27774 0.32443 
(p-value) 0.74562 0.48633 0.42907 0.02274 0.74562 
  I1 I2 I3 I4** I5 
Panel B:      
B Rated    
(14 series) 
ACAS 0.1260% 2.6220% -5.8688% -3.7693% 2.3592% 
t- test 0.14430 3.11055 -6.36060 -4.02022 2.49197 
(p-value) 0.88748 0.00828 0.00002 0.00146 0.02699 
  I1 I2*** I3*** I4*** I5** 
z- generalized sign test 1.78212 0.70796 -1.97742 -1.97742 0.70796 
(p-value) 0.07473 0.47897 0.04799 0.04799 0.47897 
    I1* I2 I3** I4** I5 
 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around effective downgrades      
Panel A:     
A Rated   
(20 series) 
ACAS -1.5835% -19.7620% 4.9825% -4.7603% -10.4242% 
t- test -0.90029 -10.55831 3.35168 -3.49377 -8.71574 
(p-value) 0.37924 0.00000 0.00335 0.00243 0.00000 
  I1 I2*** I3*** I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 1.38637 -2.21246 1.38637 -1.31275 -0.41305 
(p-value) 0.16563 0.02693 0.16563 0.18927 0.67957 
  I1 I2** I3 I4 I5 
Panel B:      
B Rated   
(10 series) 
ACAS 11.2186% -0.8361% 4.3859% -0.7338% 1.9331% 
t- test 6.00220 -0.63050 2.36253 -0.31843 0.91361 
(p-value) 0.00020 0.54405 0.04243 0.75742 0.38474 
  I1*** I2 I3** I4 I5 
z- generalized sign test 0.85024 0.85024 -0.41762 -0.41762 0.85024 
(p-value) 0.39519 0.39519 0.67622 0.67622 0.39519 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
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Table 11 - The impact of negative reviews in A and B rated Banks 
5.2. Exponential Garch output 
  Initially, the Dickey Fuller test for the unit root testing is performed to the 
abnormal spread changes       . Our tests reject the null hypothesis of unit root and 
accept the alternative that there is no unit root; thus all of our series are stationary. 
Appendix A reports an example of Dickey Fuller unit root test. 
  The best      model of different time series is determined by searching for 
different specifications that would produce significant parameters and small Akaike 
Information Criterion      in relative terms. As a result, various model 
specifications of       ,        and            are selected based on the 
condition that residuals are serially independent. In order to test for serial 
dependence, Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test is applied to time series. 
Empirical evidence cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, thus 
residuals are serially uncorrelated. Appendix B gives an example of Breusch-Godfrey 
serial correlation LM test. 
  Additionally, ARCH heteroskedasticity test detects heteroskedasticity in 
residuals by rejecting the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (see Appendix C for an 
example).Under this property, a volatility model from GARCH family, such as the    
E-GARCH model, is appropriate to time series.   Performing the E-GARCH model on 
each 190 day interval (both    and EW), the parameters are estimated through 
    I1 =  (-60, -41) I2 = (-40, -21) I3 =  (-20, -2) I4 =  (-1, +1) I5 = (+2,+20) 
Average cumulative abnormal spreads around negative reviews    
Panel A:     
A Rated   
(38 series) 
ACAS -8.1135% -2.9835% -0.6123% 2.6855% -11.4758% 
t- test -9.41142 -3.78642 -0.77447 2.90621 -12.50806 
(p-value) 0.00000 0.00054 0.44358 0.00615 0.00000 
  I1*** I2*** I3 I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test 0.10620 0.75518 1.07967 1.07967 -0.54278 
(p-value) 0.91543 0.45014 0.28029 0.28029 0.58728 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
Panel B:      
B Rated   
(23 series) 
ACAS -1.7058% -10.2151% 1.3810% 3.2314% 3.3473% 
t- test -1.52199 -9.34672 1.19754 3.08345 3.22493 
(p-value) 0.14226 0.00000 0.24384 0.00543 0.00390 
  I1 I2*** I3 I4*** I5*** 
z- generalized sign test -1.05395 0.19714 0.61417 1.86526 1.03120 
(p-value) 0.29191 0.84372 0.53910 0.06214 0.30245 
  I1 I2 I3 I4* I5 
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maximum likelihood. Applying the E-GARCH (1, 1) specification, it is found that just 
25% of the time series present significant   vector of model parameters. Essentially, 
32% of the time series produce only insignificant asymmetry coefficients, 8% 
insignificant GARCH coefficients, 4% insignificant volatility clustering coefficients and 
4% insignificant intercepts. The rest of 27% refers to series with more than one 
insignificant model coefficients. According to these findings, insignificance of GARCH 
and volatility clustering coefficients propose the suitability of an ARCH model (Engle, 
1982) or GARCH model (Bollerslev, 1986) to be performed. However, to be 
consistent across different series the E-GARCH model (Nelson, 1991) is used in order 
to account for additional significant asymmetric variations when increases or 
decreases of spreads occur. Appendix D presents an example of E-GARCH 
estimation model. 
  Table 12 reports the impact of E-GARCH model coefficients in abnormal spread 
conditional variance around credit rating announcements. Empirical evidence 
suggests that conditional volatility depends more on the previous day variance since 
volatility clustering coefficient is significant 86% of the time. In comparison, 
conditional volatility is affected more by the size than by the sign of previous 
abnormal spreads, while the GARCH and leverage coefficients are significant 75% 
and 45% of the time respectively. Taking into consideration the average coefficient 
estimates the same conclusions are drawn. The persistence effect measured by   
coefficient shows the highest average value (  = 0.582) resulting on the fact that the 
main driver of conditional volatility around credit rating announcements is the 
volatility clustering effect. A high value of   parameter means that in large shocks 
volatility requires days to fade away and finally return to its mean level. In addition, 
the GARCH coefficient    is equal to 0.337, which is greater number than the 
asymmetry coefficient    which in turn equals to 0.005. Interestingly, the low value 
of    parameter means that conditional volatility is not majorly influenced by the 
sign of spreads. Thus, the impact between positive and negative spread changes on 
conditional volatility does not differ (see also Table 13 for the impact of    by event 
type). 
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8
Table 12 - The impact of E-Garch model parameters in banking sector CDS   conditional 
variance around credit rating announcements 
 
  Panel A, B, C and D (Table 13) report the impact of E-GARCH parameters on the 
conditional variance around the four event types individually. Effective downgrades 
among other event types can cause the banking sector CDS conditional variance to 
persist more days after a large abnormal spread change. In particular, effective 
downgrades (Panel B) present the highest value of persistence parameter                  
(  = 0.654), while negative reviews (Panel D) reflect the lowest one (  = 0.534). For 
example, Figure 8 reports both the conditional and unconditional variance of 
abnormal spread changes around an effective downgrade. As expected, the pattern 
of conditional variance moves far away from the unconditional level in both 
estimation period and event window. Even in the post announcement window, there 
is no indication of variance convergence. Figure 10 reports that the conditional 
variance around a negative review moves closer to the mean level than in the case of 
effective downgrades. Though, still there is not any convergence between the two 
variances.  
 
                                                             
8
 Coefficient significance column reports the percentage for which each model coefficient is significant 
across all the time series. 
 
E-Garch Coefficients 
Average Coefficient 
Estimates 
Coefficient 
Significance 
(%)   
Effective ratings and reviews (whole sample - 146 series) 
intercept (α) -2.264 79%   
garch (β1) 0.337 75%   
assymetry (β2) 0.005 45%   
volatility clustering (η) 0.582 86%   
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Table 13 - The impact of E-Garch model parameters in banking sector CDS conditional 
variance around different event types 
 
  Therefore we can conclude that the most important driver of abnormal spread 
conditional variance around credit rating announcements is the previous conditional 
variance, and second is the size of previous abnormal spread change. This evidence 
suggests that, large shocks in spreads lead to extremely volatile abnormal spreads 
that move away from the unconditional volatility level for many days. The existence 
of highly volatile spreads that are observed even in the estimation periods could 
imply the frequent occurrence of extreme shocks in the CDS market for the banking 
sector. Probably, one explanation of this variance behavior could be the contagion 
effect in the banking sector that can increase the uncertainty of a bank due to 
deterioration in the credit quality of other banks. This phenomenon can be even 
more pronounced during a financial crisis period.  
E-Garch Coefficients 
Average Coefficient 
Estimates 
Coefficient 
Significance 
(%)   
Panel A: Effective Upgrades (whole sample - 43 series)   
intercept (α) -2.875 86%   
garch (β1) 0.391 81%   
assymetry (β2) 0.000 51%   
volatility clustering (η) 0.609 84%   
Panel B: Effective Downgrades (whole sample - 30 series) 
intercept (α) -1.732 83%   
garch (β1) 0.344 83%   
assymetry (β2) 0.043 47%   
volatility clustering (η) 0.654 87%   
Panel C: Positive Reviews (whole sample - 12 series)   
intercept (α) -1.974 67%   
garch (β1) 0.417 58%   
assymetry (β2) -0.041 25%   
volatility clustering (η) 0.544 83%   
Panel D: Negative Reviews (whole sample - 61 series)   
intercept (α) -2.152 75%   
garch (β1) 0.279 70%   
assymetry (β2) -0.001 43%   
volatility clustering (η) 0.534 89%   
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  For example, Figure 8 and Figure 9 present the conditional variance of two banks 
around an effective downgrade. They reveal that there is not any discernible pattern 
of conditional variance in the event windows of the particular effective downgrade, 
compared to the “normal period”. Though, there is an indication that conditional 
variance is being increased again 60 days before the downgrades which probably can 
indicate some impact of the significant large abnormal spread changes that occur 
around event dates (see  Table 2 for the significant      around downgrades). 
Interestingly, the large spikes in volatility around downgrades are presented in 
   (between 40 to 20 days before) and in     (2 days after the event and for 20 days 
thereafter) in both figures. That is also confirmed by the t test which suggests the 
largest significant abnormal spread changes during these event time intervals. As a 
result, the incorporation of conditional variance methodology in the event study 
accurately reflects the variance of abnormal spread changes observed in the market. 
In this particular study, the importance of conditional variance methodology           
(E-GARCH model) captures the significant volatility clustering effect, that the 
historical standard deviation approach would have not capture otherwise. 
  Similarly, Figure 10 and Figure 11 illustrate the case of negative reviews. Although, 
Figure 10 presents large spikes again around the days of significant large abnormal 
spread performance - that is between 60 to 20 days before and 20 days following the 
event date - Figure 11 does not confirm that. Instead, the dynamic of conditional 
variance in the post announcement window is different. This finding agrees with 
Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2013) who also find different volatility dynamics between 
few B rated firms in the event windows of downgrades. It is worth noting that given 
the aforementioned comparison we perform a further investigation of this issue. 
Considerably different volatility dynamics are also observed between various banks 
in the particular sample, around the same event type. Thus, in vast comparison with 
Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2013) our work indicates that the persistence coefficient is 
more important driver of conditional volatility than the GARCH coefficient. The 
reason behind this difference in our results possibly can be attributed to our 
particular sample. Our sample consists solely from the banking sector whereas the 
sample of Castellano and D’Ecclesia (2013) it includes other business sectors as well. 
One may attribute this effect to possibly contagion effect that maybe is more 
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persistent in banking sector. Therefore we recommend more extensive future 
research regarding this issue and its effect. 
 
Effective Downgrade 29/11/2011 
 
Figure 8 - Conditional and Unconditional variance around effective downgrade (Barclays 
Bank Plc.) 
 
Effective Downgrade 01/04/2008 
 
Figure 9 - Conditional and Unconditional variance around effective downgrade (UBS AG) 
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Negative review 14/06/2011 
 
Figure 10 - Conditional and Unconditional variance around negative review (BNP Paribas) 
 
Negative review 2/12/2008 
 
Figure 11 - Conditional and Unconditional variance around negative review (Bayerische 
Landesbank) 
6. Research Limitations 
  In this section we report some limitations of our empirical analysis on the impact 
of credit rating announcements on banking sector CDS spreads. 
  One research limitation that is common to all Event Studies is the problem of 
contaminated event samples. This is the case of analyzing samples which include 
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simultaneous credit rating announcements by Credit Rating Agencies or multiple 
announcements during the Estimation Period and Event Window. In order to avoid 
contamination effects in our data we considerably omit information by reducing the 
percentage of analyzed events to 36% of the initial sample. Ideally, the construction 
of a second contaminated sample that would include all dropped observations could 
be compared with the uncontaminated sample and produce more accurate 
inferences. Due to the large computational problems that might arise for our sample 
this is not attempted in this particular research but it is considered and proposed for 
future research. 
  This remaining 36% of the event sample that we finally analyze concerns 146 
various credit rating announcements. Although someone would consider this event 
sample small for an Event Study, we further subdivide it to smaller event groups in 
order to comment on further CDS spread behavior. In fact, an increasing number of 
events could describe CDS market response better and draw more powerful 
conclusions. Thus, we report the results of statistical hypothesis testing in various 
event subgroups and we state our concerns about possibly weak inferences on CDS 
abnormal performance. To be consistent, for subgroups that the observations are 
quite small the particular results are not reported. Those are the positive reviews for 
groups by credit rating class, bank region and credit rating agency.  
  As we have already mentioned in the description of our Methodology, the 
property under both parametric and nonparametric test are well specified is the 
cross sectional independence of abnormal spread changes.  The validity of this 
assumption requires an event sample of non overlapped event dates or a diversified 
sample across industries (Ahlgren & Antell, 2011). Since in this work only the banking 
sector is examined, this limitation refers to the number of event dates across banks 
that overlap in time across our sample. Nevertheless, due to the small number of 
these observations compared to the whole event sample someone would not expect 
significant inference biases. 
  There are two normal behavior models that search for abnormal returns; those 
are the mean adjusted model and the market model. The former is applied on this 
research and it is the simplest one while the latter entails a more sophisticated 
approach in Event Studies. Brown and Warner (1985) applied the mean adjusted 
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model to measure for abnormal stock returns but Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, 
and Xu (2009) disputed its suitability to bond abnormal returns. Thus, the efficiency 
of this particular model in CDS data is controversial considering that CDS spread 
changes are similar to bond returns. In this work, the contribution of the mean 
adjusted model is expected to be enhanced by the accounting for heteroskedasticity 
in abnormal spreads through the E-GARCH model. 
  Finally, an important research limitation concerns the appropriateness of           
E-GARCH volatility model in our particular time series. ARCH heteroskedasticity test 
indicates that 25% of the time series do not present ARCH effects thus a volatility 
model in those cases is inappropriate. Though, to be consistent across time series we 
finally apply the E-GARCH volatility model in order to consider for ARCH effects in 
the majority of time series. 
7. Conclusion 
  In this work, we apply Event Study Methodology in order to examine banking 
sector CDS response to credit rating announcements around the period 2006-2011. 
We also demonstrate the contribution of conditional volatility methodology in 
producing more accurate inferences to CDS abnormal spread reaction in this sector. 
  Our analysis reveals anticipation effects in spreads up to 60 days before effective 
ratings and reviews. Significant post announcement effects are also detected for 
credit rating announcements, which are higher in magnitude than the 
announcement effects. We further result on that CDS spreads are more sensitive 
around negative credit rating events since pronounced anticipation and post 
announcement impacts are observed. Though, these effects are more powerful 
across the event windows of actual downgrades than negative reviews. One 
important finding suggests that CDS spreads strongly anticipate actual downgrades 
since extreme cumulative abnormal spread changes are reported 40 days before. 
Probably, the large values of abnormal spread changes in anticipation of rating 
announcements relate to frequent trade of inside information in the market that 
indicates its inefficiency. 
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  We also find that both the origin and the rating class of banks influence CDS 
spread changes. First, non European banks when compared to European ones seem 
to be more sensitive toward effective downgrades while for negative reviews is the 
other way round. Second, we can clearly suggest that A rated banks are more 
affected by negative credit rating events (both effective downgrades and negative 
reviews) when compared to B rated banks.  In addition, credit rating announcements 
that are publicly released by different rating agencies can impose unlike impacts on 
CDS spreads. Such as that investors seem to rely more on S&P negative reviews 
when compared to negative reviews that are released by Moody’s. 
  The reliability of our empirical results is enhanced by the use of conditional 
variance estimated by the E-GARCH model in statistical hypothesis testing. The 
contribution of conditional volatility in the particular Event Study is highlighted by 
the ability of the E-GARCH model to account for the pronounced persistence effect 
in variance that would not be considered otherwise. Unlike Castellano and D’Ecclesia 
(2013) CDS abnormal spread conditional variance is more influenced by the 
persistence variance impact than the size of abnormal spread changes.  
  We are further motivated to conduct an extensive future research on banking 
sector CDS conditional variance behavior around credit rating announcements. We 
are interested in investigating the reason behind the considerably different volatility 
dynamics that we observe for various banks, around the same rating announcement 
type. 
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Appendix A. Dickey Fuller unit root test 
Wells Fargo & Co. – Effective upgrade 01/08/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: AS has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=14)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.71005  0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.465014
5% level -2.876677
10% level -2.574917
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(AS)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/10/13   Time: 19:13
Sample (adjusted): 8/12/2005 29/08/2006
Included observations: 189 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
AS(-1) -1.634413 0.119213 -13.71005 0.0000
D(AS(-1)) 0.178757 0.071647 2.494967 0.0135
C -0.000868 0.002002 -0.433679 0.6650
R-squared 0.705103     Mean dependent var 0.000192
Adjusted R-squared 0.701932     S.D. dependent var 0.050383
S.E. of regression 0.027507     Akaike info criterion -4.333015
Sum squared resid 0.140733     Schwarz criterion -4.281559
Log likelihood 412.4699     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.312169
F-statistic 222.3643     Durbin-Watson stat 2.010222
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Appendix B. Breusch Godfrey Serial correlation LM test 
Westpac Banking Corporation – Positive review 08/11/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 0.387837     Prob. F(2,185) 0.6791
Obs*R-squared 0.786582     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6748
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/10/13   Time: 18:28
Sample: 16/03/2006 6/12/2006
Included observations: 190
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -5.54E-05 0.001076 -0.051458 0.9590
AR(1) 0.761912 0.878080 0.867703 0.3867
MA(1) -0.129954 0.186459 -0.696958 0.4867
RESID(-1) -0.642101 0.731938 -0.877262 0.3815
RESID(-2) -0.190319 0.240565 -0.791136 0.4299
R-squared 0.004140     Mean dependent var 0.000186
Adjusted R-squared -0.017392     S.D. dependent var 0.031242
S.E. of regression 0.031513     Akaike info criterion -4.050886
Sum squared resid 0.183715     Schwarz criterion -3.965438
Log likelihood 389.8342     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.016272
F-statistic 0.192266     Durbin-Watson stat 2.002050
Prob(F-statistic) 0.942213
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Appendix C. ARCH Heteroskedasticity test  
Commonwealth Bank of Australia – Effective Downgrade 01/12/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH
F-statistic 23.42647     Prob. F(2,185) 0.0000
Obs*R-squared 37.99112     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 08/12/13   Time: 17:35
Sample (adjusted): 12/04/2011 29/12/2011
Included observations: 188 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.000472 0.000149 3.168685 0.0018
RESID^2(-1) 0.240285 0.069997 3.432809 0.0007
RESID^2(-2) 0.305684 0.069997 4.367122 0.0000
R-squared 0.202080     Mean dependent var 0.001038
Adjusted R-squared 0.193454     S.D. dependent var 0.001885
S.E. of regression 0.001693     Akaike info criterion -9.908562
Sum squared resid 0.000530     Schwarz criterion -9.856917
Log likelihood 934.4048     Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.887637
F-statistic 23.42647     Durbin-Watson stat 1.977186
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Appendix D. Exponential GARCH Model 
Bank of China – Positive review 30/05/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: AS
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution
Date: 11/10/13   Time: 15:36
Sample: 4/10/2006 27/06/2007
Included observations: 191
Convergence achieved after 37 iterations
MA Backcast: 2/10/2006 3/10/2006
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7)
LOG(GARCH) = C(3) + C(4)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + C(5)
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(6)*LOG(GARCH(-1))
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
MA(1) -0.396732 0.099589 -3.983678 0.0001
MA(2) -0.059028 0.096305 -0.612924 0.5399
Variance Equation
C(3) -1.305818 0.264624 -4.934626 0.0000
C(4) 0.643883 0.091448 7.040999 0.0000
C(5) -0.173677 0.065464 -2.653030 0.0080
C(6) 0.869965 0.038175 22.78918 0.0000
R-squared 0.104882     Mean dependent var 0.001355
Adjusted R-squared 0.100146     S.D. dependent var 0.048048
S.E. of regression 0.045579     Akaike info criterion -3.896736
Sum squared resid 0.392637     Schwarz criterion -3.794570
Log likelihood 378.1383     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.855354
Durbin-Watson stat 1.812627
Inverted MA Roots       .51          -.12
